## 1NC

### FW 1NC

#### A – Interpretation:

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action by the United States Federal Government.

#### B – Definitions

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

#### American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### C – Vote neg –

#### First is Decisionmaking

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Additionally, The best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy

#### Mutually accessible information – There is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.

#### Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – The problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions. We all know plans don’t actually happen, but practicing imagining the consequences of our decisions in the high-stakes games of public policymaking makes other decisionmaking easier.

#### External actors – the decisions we make should be analyzed not in a vacuum but in the complex social field that surrounds us

#### Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that \_\_\_\_\_ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Our method solves – Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink

Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011

(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

### Marxism 1NC

**Their ethics of hospitality for the Other are precisely the ethics used to justify free market capitalism. Hospitality without obligation is code for hospitality without structural change. They reduce the material causes of hunger to a mediation on the structure of language.**

Kimberly **DeFazio**, English Department, State University of New York, Stony Brook, **2003**, “The Imperialism of "Eating Well"; The Red Critique; Issue #8; http://www.redcritique.org/Spring2003/theimperialismofeatingwell.htm

Exemplary of post-al ethics is **Derrida**'s text, "Eating Well, Or the Calculation of the Subject" which both articulates the main assumptions of contemporary ethics and its relation with food and hunger, as well as provides the philosophical groundwork for dominant re-distributive approaches to social inequality today because of the way in which it **isolates culture from the economic and turns all questions of social inequality into mediations on the structure of language as the limit of knowing**. Derrida uses "eating well" as a trope to privilege an ethical way of life, which, following the precepts of deconstruction, resists all totalizing knowledges and practices, especially those that make distinctions between who eats and who doesn't eat, or who eats and who gets "eaten". **He argues that the fundamental presupposition of "ethics" today**, if one **is not to begin from a "totalizing" premise in which for instance one can determine the reasons why some eat and some do not**, is "no longer one of knowing if it is 'good' to eat the other or if the other is 'good' to eat, nor of knowing which other. One eats him regardless and lets oneself be eaten by him…" (282). In other words, he argues that the only possibility for living an "ethical" life is to recognize that we cannot avoid "eating" the other, for eating presupposes the very existence of the other (whether animal or vegetable). There is, in short, no outside to the discourse of "eating": even those who do not eat are constructed by the discourse of eating (which is constituted by linguistic relations of otherness and inequality). Of course, this discourse is inherently unequal but, as Derrida argues, there is no other discourse. The issue, Derrida claims, is that "since one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes good to eat, [the question becomes . . . ] how for goodness' sake should one eat well?" (282). **Instead of asking why some eat and some do not**, or why some eat and some get eaten, **Derrida suggests we must learn to eat without "violence"**, by "learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat" (282). Or, to put this another way, **the primary concern of engaging hunger today is not to uncover the root causes of social inequality that lead to hunger, but rather to turn "hunger" into a meditation on the linguistic hierarchies and rhetorical inconsistencies of all explanations**. According to this logic, the ethical subject is one who no longer simply identifies with the self but respects the other by "identify[ing] with the other, who is to be assimilated, interiorized," (283). The self is never single but plural, and indeed the boundary between self and other is continually blurred. And it is precisely this ethical relation to the other that Derrida calls "infinite hospitality" (282): the idea that one gives to the other "infinitely"—without beginning or end, without boundaries or determinants. The "excessiveness" of hospitality in fact becomes even more explicit in Derrida's recent text Of Hospitality, where he writes: "To be what it 'must' be, hospitality must not pay a debt, or be governed by a duty [...] For if I practice hospitality 'out of duty' […] this hospitality of paying up is no longer an absolute hospitality, it is no longer graciously offered beyond debt and economy" (83). **Hospitality**, I argue, **is** like "ethics" and "eating well", a trope **deployed to exceed class binaries**. As **Derrida emphasizes, hospitality cannot be the effect of existing relations of material inequality (i.e., to "repay" a social or economic debt**); nor can it be "legislated". "Repaying" and "legislating" are textualist codes for the social praxis of **changing objective historical structures**—codes which **are seen as "monolithic"** and thus as stopping the play of differences that inherently undermine all attempts at conceptualization. **Hospitality**, instead, **"negotiates" on subjective and local terms the already existing unequal relations** among people. It is an act of ethical willfulness that must be motivated spontaneously, without condition, obligation, or determination. But it is precisely **this textual logic of** "graciousness" and **"hospitality"** that **enables corporations on the one hand to refuse to pay taxes on their profits**—taxes on which working people are forced to rely for social services—**and** on the other **to "donate" large** (tax-free) **sums to charity** (to be used at the discretion of local administrators). Corporations too are invested in precisely such notions of "hospitality" because they function outside the "law". **Rather than actually opening any space from which to examine the inherent contradictions of language, Derrida's deconstruction of any connection between the local and the global operates to legitimate the suspension of all social structures such as regulation of the market** and eliminates any conception that the state is required to ensure livable wages, support comprehensive healthcare, or to finance advanced educations for the working class. **Hospitality is in effect a code**, not so much for sophisticated reading, but **for economic deregulation. It is the theoretical equivalent of free-trade agreements**. That is, it is an ethical ruse for the complete privatization of social resources under imperialism. Derrida's entire argument is based on the assumption that, as he puts it, "one must eat". But in fact many worldwide do not eat, and even more do not "eat well". **What appears to be a "beyond" class argument, in other words, is an alibi for the interests of the bourgeois subject, for whom food**, like other social resources, **is always already available. Not only does the trope of ethical eating naturalize the relation between the haves and the have-nots, but the very availability of the food "eaten well" by the subject**—that is, the conditions under which it is produced—is taken for granted. **Derridean ethics**, which claims to resist essentializing social relations by appealing to the textual slippage of social codes, **is in actuality a means of defending the interests of the ruling class by removing the ethical act from determination by material conditions**.

**By displacing class struggle into the plane of the symbolic, Derrida defers explanation of the concrete connections between culture and the organization of production. This substitutes frivolous cultural theory for genuine emancipatory knowledge.**

Deborah **Kelsh**, **2001,** “(D)evolutionary Socialism and the Containment of Class: For a Red Theory of Class,” The Red Critique (1), http://redcritique.org/spring2001/devolutionarysocialism.htm

The growing contradictions of **the contemporary situation in which the increase of wealth simply intensifies social inequality** instead of bringing about economic and cultural equality **have shown** not simply the inadequacy, but **the frivolousness of the explanations** of the daily **offered by the dominant cultural and social theory. Frivolous explanations**—by which I mean various "post" theories—**obscure the logic that relates culture to capital and are unable to explain the actual, material practices that produce people as subjects. By "subject," I mean individuals not as they appear in their own or other people’s imaginations**, as Zizek and other left theorists have mapped subjectivity. Rather, **I mean individuals**, as Marx and Engels have written, **as they "produce materially and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." "Frivolous theory" cannot explain, without "any mystification and speculation"** as Marx and Engels emphasize, **"the connection of the social and political structure with production**" *(The German Ideology* 46-7). The logic of the "frivolous" is the dominant Derridean mode of understanding cultural practices. **Derrida**, in his 1973 (1980) book *The Archeology of the Frivolous,* does what he does in every text: he **textualizes all practices as effects of** the slippage of **signifiers and thereby foregrounds the gap between the sign and its referent as both the gap that needs to be explained and as one that is immanent, an effect of the laws of motion of any symbolic system. He thus both displaces onto the plane of the epistemological the gap between the classes, and** he **treats language transhistorically**, displacing Volosinov's argument that the **"sign" is "an arena of class struggle"** (23). By arguing further that "philosophical style congenitally leads to frivolity" (125), **Derrida defers explanation itself onto the plane of the rhetorical** and semiotic. **This series of deferrals, disguised as epistemological relays, of course also defers explanation of the relation between culture and production. Because the frivolous posits the limits of knowledge as transhistorical, unrelated to the limits imposed on it by** history understood as **the struggle of antagonistic classes over ownership of the means of production, it also posits that no class or social movement can ever produce knowledge that is reliable enough to guide emancipatory action**. The unreliability of knowledge is simply "the way things are." **Political struggle itself is thus transformed into the frivolous: an endless** and excessive **quest driven by desire for the ineluctable signified, where the best one can hope for is a little more of "what is." The frivolous**, then, **is an idealist and rather hollow mode of reading whose privileging of the semiotic for its ambiguity represents the interests of the bourgeoisie in blocking the development of revolutionary consciousness, and at the moment when the global divide between the haves and the have-nots is increasing. The gap that needs to be explored is the gap between the classes, not the gap between the sign and its referent that is privileged and reified by frivolous theory.**

**Materialism explains reality – focus on the discursive/symbolic obfuscates that relation and makes oppression inevitable. The affirmatives focus on the discursive/symbolic reveals the extent to which they have given up on actually challenging the structures of oppression. But far from being a post-capitalist age in which all social experience is textually or discursively produced, it is a material world. Only the alternative’s endorse of a materialist method can account for the ways in which certain classes create and deploy rhetoric to legitimize a capitalist mode of social relations**

Cloud 1(Prof of Comm at Texas) [Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm]

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). **We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomen**a. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them**. In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure** at the level of the economy and the state. **It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformatio**n even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. **At the core of the issue is a debate** across the humanities and social sciences with regard to **whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment** in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, **there is a great deal of evidence against claims** that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, **both class polarization** (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) **and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism** (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) **still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts**. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in **the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor** in the U.S. (as well as **around the world) continued to grow,** **in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates**. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8**). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation** and progressive critical practice **in fact encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and** perhaps **revolutionary potential. Instead**, on their arguments, **we must** recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and **settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism.** Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn**: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases** they themselves **are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world**" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. **The point**, though, **is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other**. Marxist ideology critique, understands that **classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics** wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. **Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.** [cont’d] [cont;d] Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144). **Within this understanding**, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: **Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said,** into the silences and the suppressed or missing, **in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details** and representations **of our lives**. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, **materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--**specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges**. (p. 7)

## 2NC

**Since we live in a country that perpetuates massive violence on a global scale discussion of internationalviolence is an ethical requirement – their interpretation is self-serving – if we are actually to direct our ethics to the other that is not here, that means considering those who can’t even be here to debate**

**Sunstrom 8, Associate Professor of Philosophy**

[2008, Ronald R. Sunstrom is a black Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Francisco; additionally, he teaches for USF's African American Studies program and the Master of Public Affairs program for the Leo T. McCarthy Center of Public Service and the Common Good. He was awarded the 2008 Sankofa Faculty Award from USF's Multicultural Student Services, USF's 2009 Ignatian Service Award, and was a co-winner of the 2010 USF Distinguished Teaching Award. His areas of research include political theory, critical social and race theory, and African American and Asian American philosophy, “The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice”, pp. 65-92]

**It would be odd and troubling for the nation to merrily work toward justice at “home,” all the while neglecting the demands of those whom the nation regarded as perpetual foreigners** **(and not really being at “home” in the nation)** **and the demands of global justice**. **Such a vision of justice is self-serving and morally hollow.** **Long-existing civil rights claims should not delimit the nation’s moral boundaries and its conception of civil rights**, **thus ipso facto severing them from internationally determined human rights**. The reactions of some citizens to the browning of America, unfortunately, open up this possibility, which is yet another evasion of social justice.7 **When I broach these issues**, or any of the particular issues discussed in this book, **the response I frequently receive is that these issues are red herrings that divert our attention away from the real enemy, that of white supremacy**.8 **I am dubious about this complaint**; after all, **focusing on “white supremacy” does not directly address the particulars of the interethnic confl icts that arise from the browning of America.** **Perhaps**, though, **these critics mean that we should focus on how “white supremacy,” in the form of institutionalized racism or white power**, **divides minority group**s, so as to conquer them and leave them to fi ght over a limited set of resources. Alternatively, **these critiques would have us focus on how Latinos, Asian Americans, Americans who identify as multiracial, and immigrants adopt anti-black racism and the privileges of whiteness as they assimilate into American society**. I think **the latter argument is bogus,** and chapter 3 is devoted in part to explaining why. As for the former, I think “**white supremacy” is too broad and vague a category to be helpful, and that focusing on such a fl awed category of power can be positively harmful.** **Such moves simply sidestep the particular issues that are raised in interethnic confl icts and may even contribute to the evasions I outlined earlier**. **The people of the United States**, as they experience and participate in the browning of America, **should resist both types of evasions**. The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice argues, in contrast, that the people of the United States should see in its demographic change the transformation of social justice. They should welcome that transformation and view it as an opportunity to satisfy old debts and expand in a cosmopolitan direction the very idea of social justice.

## 1NR

**Absent questions of engagement with existing institutions their aff is useless – individual change is overshadowed by dominant structures**

**Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6**

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these **relations constitute our identity as social actors**. **According to this** relational **model** of societies, **one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded**. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ **At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects**. **This ‘lattice-work’** of relations **constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them**. Thus, the **relations**, the structures, **are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them**. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘**people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents**’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. **If there is an ontological difference between society and people**, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that **we need** a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, **a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures**. **This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system**. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. **Bourdieu** is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He **is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making**, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, **the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to** the concept of **a ‘social field’**. According to Bourdieu, **a social field is ‘a network**, or a configuration, **of objective relations between positions objectively defined’**. **A social field**, then, **refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants**. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. **The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit** and habituation, **rather than consciously learned rules**. **The habitus is imprinted** and encoded **in a socializing process that commences during early childhood**. **It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching**. **Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge**, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ **Thus social practices are produced** in, and **by, the encounter between**: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) **the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within**; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. **Society**, as field of relations, **exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time**; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, **given that behavior is seemingly** recurrent, patterned, ordered, **institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations** and rules **that govern it**. **Contrary to individualist theory, these relations**, rules and roles **are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals**; that is, **their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness** or to the attributes **of individuals**. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. **Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is**, as Foucault has put it, **‘a complex** and independent **reality that has its own laws** and mechanisms of reaction, **its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance**. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

*Ideology DA – Inclusion of particular theoretical abstractions destroys the cohesive epistemology of the alt – only a pure focus on concrete social practices creates a coherent ideological strategy – the perm diverts our attention away from material structures of power.*

**Bannerji 5 (Himani, Professor of Sociology & Equity Studies @ York University, PhD from University of Toronto, “Building from Marx: Reflections on Class and Race”, Social Justice Vol. 32 No. 4 p. 144, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29768341)**

**If this formative integrity or "unity" of the social is "ruptured"** (to use another of Marx' phrases in Grundrisse), **then we have phenomenal object forms or thought objects that are fetishized. The work of Marxist theorists is to deconstruct this object form and return it to its concrete, diverse social determinations.** As Lukacs (1980: 99-137) puts it, **an ontology of social being can only be appropriately understood with an epistemology that connects thought to its material socio-historical ground.** As such, empiricist or positivist versions of Marxism will not do, because they tend to depict the concrete as no more than a "thing" or an "object," as a dead "fact." **Attempts to rupture mutually constitutive and diverse determinations and present this as reality lead to the problems that bedevils social movements that**, to be effective, **ought to integrate "race," gender, and class. Unintentionally, we produce reified thought objects that defy social understanding and are occlusive or truncated. We confuse the specificity of social forms or figurations with disconnected particularities.** Thus, **culture becomes nonmaterial, asocial, and solely discursive, while economy or polity lack mediatory forms of consciousness.** As noted, **this fractured reading results in ideology, in bourgeois democracy's claim to offer equality of citizenship or rights while legally preserving and enhancing actual social relations of inequality and ruling. In criticizing this bourgeois political economy, Marx repeatedly elaborates his theory of a mode** (as style, fashion, ensemble) **of production.** In opposition to liberal/bourgeois thought, he shows how **each specific social form serves as the microcosm of the social macrocosm, just as each physical cell of the body holds the entire genetic code.** Such a mode of understanding is anti-dualist and anti-positivist. The mode of production, as Marx (1973: 97) puts it in the Grundrisse, is not "linearly, causally organized." By employing the notion of mediation, between social relations and forms of consciousness, both practical and ideological, he shows how an entire significatory/communicative and expressive social ensemble must obtain for any specific economy and polity to operate and be effective. Seen thus "socially," class cannot be genderless or cultureless, or culture genderless and classless. **Capital is obviously a social practice, not just a theoretical abstraction.** As such, its reproductive and realization processes are rooted in civil society, in its cultural/social ground. Class in this sense, for Marx and others, is a category of civil society.19 The exploitation of labor is not simply an arithmetic ratio of labor to technology in the terrain of means of production. Social and cultural factors, for example of gender and "race," enter into it and with their implied norms and forms organize the social space that comprehends capitalism as a mode of production, an organization of civil society. We enter a realm of extensive and subtle mediations that determine forms, values, processes, and objects of production.20 Therefore  **"class," when seen concretely, relies upon and exceeds what we call economy.** The once vocal debates on household labor of women, wages for housework, and the relationship of slavery to capitalism revealed the far-flung sociocultural roots of economy. Thus, **we might identify "race" and patriarchy/gender with the** so-called **extra-economic** or cultural/discursive, but nonetheless social, **moments of the overall mode of capitalist production that has its own social ontology.** Marx (1973: 94) signals this formative relation between production and reproduction when he speaks of mediation as "the act through which the whole process again runs its course." Therefore, as modes of mediation, gender or "race" help to produce the constant devaluation of certain social groups' embodiment and labor power, and create a "color coded" cultural commonsense for the state and the society as a whole (see Backhouse, 1999; Razack, 2002). In The German Ideology, Marx identifies as "ideology" the epistemology that ruptures the integrity of the socially concrete at a conceptual level and posits this as a property of the social. In contrast to much familiar Marxism, **ideology for Marx encompasses more than its thought content and includes the very form of knowledge production that generates content that desocializes, depoliticizes, and dehistoricizes our social understanding.** Though Marx' primary concern is with the precise method that produces ideology, he is also deeply concerned with the thought content o

r ideas that are generated. As they are ideas of ruling, they must be specifically addressed by our political organizations. Thus, **racializing discourses need to be considered in these terms.** In a section entitled "Ruling class and ruling ideas," Marx states: The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., **the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of** **mental production, so that** thereby, generally speaking, **the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it** (1970: 64). After offering this cryptic, though highly suggestive view of how a "cultural commonsense" for domination is created that legitimates and reproduces the overall relations and institutions of ruling, Marx (Ibid.: 64) states categorically that **"ruling ideas,"** or what we call generally prevalent ideas**, "are nothing more than the ideal** [i.e., cultural/formal] **expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance."** It is not surprising that **the dominant relations of** patriarchal colonial **capitalism** would **produce racist patriarchal discourses of physical, social, and cultural differences. This is exactly what happens when the discourses or ideological categories of "race"** or "human nature" **are employed to "explain" social behavior or cultural characteristics, when in actuality, they no more than interpret them.** Most important, the question is how such occlusive, substitutive, or displacing discourses of ideological categories are generated. In The German Ideology, **Marx** outlines this epistemological practice, connecting it with the social division of manual and mental labor. He **exposes the disciplinary practices of metaphysicians whereby everyday ideas, events, and experiences are decontextualized, over-generalized, or over-particularized from their originating social relations** and interests. Then **these empirical bits of de-grounded ideas are reconfigured into discursive systems or interpretive devices that take on a semblance of independence and substantiveness.** It is helpful to paraphrase and quote Marx here. Considering ideology to be an epistemological device employed in decontextualization and extrapolation, Marx offers a disclosure of the method. He calls them "tricks" and identifies three of them. We can begin by "considering the course of history" by "detach[ing] the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent existence" (1970: 65). **Having detached them from their specific social and historical locations, we now "confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the condition of production and the producers of these ideas..."** (Ibid.: 65). **Now we have a set of ideas or discourses independent of their social ontology. They appear to generate each other,** appear even sui generic, **but are claimed to be shaping, even creating, the very social realities that gave rise to them in the first place**. **Thus, consciousness gives rise to existence, rather than existence to consciousness**, understood as conscious existence. Life imitates or illustrates theory. **Only "if we ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of these ideas,"**  says Marx (Ibid.), **then we truly produce "ideology."** We can blithely forget that notions such as honor and loyalty came into being in the time of aristocracy and the dominance of the bourgeoisie produced concepts of freedom or equality (Ibid.). So, "**increasingly abstract ideas hold sway**, i.e., ideas **which increasingly take on the form of universality**" (Ibid.). **Hiding behind abstract universality, time-honored metaphysicality, ideas of ruling, for example, of "race" or gender, represent their interests "as the common interest of all members of society..."** (Ibid.). Intellectuals or ideologues organic to a system of ruling, guardians of property relations, then take upon themselves the task of development and systemization of these decontextualizing concepts. **We know well of the amount of philosophical, "scientific," and cultural labor that have gone into the production of "race,"** and of practices that have gone into racialization of whole legal systems and polities.21 Needless to say, **diverting attention from power-organized differences in everyday life, history, and social relations can only be useful for the purpose of ruling, of hegemony, not of resistance. Ideological forms masquerade as knowledge. They simply produce discursivities, incorporating bits of decontextualized ideas, events, or experiences with material consciousness of a practical kind. The modus operandi of these "ruling knowledges" relies on epistemologies that create essentialization, homogenization** (i.e., de-specification), **and an aspatial and atemporal universalization. Since the most powerful trick of ideology is to sever a concept from its originating and mediating social relations, used in such a way even critical and resisting concepts**, such as "class" or the feminist category of "woman," **can become occlusive and serve the interest of ruling relations through exclusion and invisibility of power in relations of difference. Struggles that have riven the world of feminist theory reveal that the category of "woman" in its desocialized** (**class**/"race") **and dehistoricized** (colonialism and imperialism) **deployment has helped to smuggle in the political agenda of middle-class, white women and hidden the relationship of dominance that some social groups of women hold with regard to others.**

**AT:Perm**

**AND SO MUCH FOR YOUR PERMUTATION—CAPITALISM IS AN INERTIAL SYSTEM—ANY VESITAGE LEFT REMAINING BY THE PERMUTATION WILL INEVITABLY SPIN BACK UP. LIKE A MANY-HEADED HYDRA, IT WILL REGENERATE WITH EVERY ATTEMPT THAT ATTACKS THE INSTRUMENTS AS OPPOSSED TO THE SYSTEM ITSELF\*\*\***

**KOVEL** (Alger Hiss Prof. At Bard) **2002**

[Joel, The Enemy of Nature, Zed Books, p. 142-3//wyo-tjc]

The value-term that subsumes everything into the spell of capital sets going a kind of wheel of accumulation, from production to consumption and back, spinning ever more rapidly as the inertial mass of capital grows, and generating its force field as a spinning magnet generates an electrical field. This phenomenon has important implications for the reformability of the system. Because capital is so spectral, and succeeds so well in ideologically mystifying its real nature, attention is constantly deflected from the actual source of eco-destabilization to the instruments by which that source acts. The real problem, however, is the whole mass of globally accumulated capital, along with the speed of its circulation and the class structures sustaining this

. That is what generates the force field, in proportion to its own scale; and it is this force field, acting across the numberless points of insertion that constitute the ecosphere, that creates ever larger agglomerations of capital, sets the ecological crisis going, and keeps it from being resolved. For one fact may be taken as certain — that to resolve the ecological crisis as a whole, as against tidying up one corner or another, is radically incompatible with the existence of gigantic pools of capital, the force field these induce, the criminal underworld with which they connect, and, by extension, the elites who comprise the transnational bourgeoisie. And by not resolving the crisis as a whole, we open ourselves to the spectre of another mythical creature, the many-headed hydra, that regenerated itself the more its individual tentacles were chopped away.

To realize this is to recognize that there is no compromising with capital, no schema of reformism that will clean up its act by making it act more greenly or efficiently We shall explore the practical implications of this thesis in Part III, and here need simply to restate the conclusion in blunt terms: green capital, or non-polluting capital, is preferable to the immediately ecodestructive breed on its immediate terms. But this is the lesser point, and diminishes with its very success. For green capital (or ‘socially/ecologically responsible investing’) exists, by its very capital-nature, essentially to create more value, and this leaches away from the concretely green location to join the great pool, and follows its force field into zones of greater concentration, expanded profitability — and greater ecodestruction.

**THE INEVITABLE CRISIS OF CAPITAL WILL SPUR TOTALITARIANISM—ONLY THE EMERGENCE OF THE ALTERNATIVE CAN HEAD THIS OFF**

**MESZAROS** (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) **1995**

[Istavan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition, // wyo]

p. 146

In view of the fact that the most intractable of the global capital system’s contradictions is the one between the internal unrestrainability of its economic constituents and the now inescapable necessity of introducing major restraints, any hope for finding a way out of this vicious circle under the circumstances marked by the activation of capital’s absolute limits must be vested in the political dimension of the system. Thus, in the light of recent legislative measures which already point in this direction, there can be no doubt that the full power of the state will be activated to serve the end of squaring capital’s vicious circle, even if it means subjecting all potential dissent to extreme authoritarian constraints. Equally there can be no doubt that whether or not such a remedial action (in conformity to the global capital system’s structural limits) will be successfully pursued, despite its obvious authoritarian character and destructiveness, will depend on the working class’s ability or failure to radically rearticulate the socialist movement as a truly international enterprise.In any event, what makes matters particularly serious is the fact that the far-reaching issues themselves which confront humankind at the present stage of historical development cannot be avoided either by the ruling capital system or by any alternative to it. Although, as a matter of historical contingency, they have arisen from the activation of capital’s absolute limits, they cannot be conveniently bypassed, nor their gravity wished out of existence.

On the contrary, they remain the overriding requirement of all-embracing remedial action in the reproductive practices of humankind for as long as the vicious circle of capital’s present-day historical contingency is not irretrievably consigned to the past. Indeed, paradoxically, the ability to meet in a sustainable way the absolute historical challenge that had arisen from the perverse historical contingencies and contradictions of the capital system constitutes the measure of viability of any social metabolic alternative to the ruling order. Consequently, the struggle to overcome the threatening absolute limits of the capital system is bound to determine the historical agenda for the foreseeable future.

**THE ELITE WILL ACCEPT TRANSITION – THEY HAVE AS MUCH TO GAIN AND LOSE AS EVERYONE**

**PAELHKE** (Prof. Poli Sci @ Trent University) **2003**

[Robert, “Environmentalism and Progressive Politics”, Explorations in Environmental Political Theory, ed. Kassiola, M.E. Sharpe //mac-tjc]

Why would one even imagine that the rich in the rich countries would ever accept such outcomes? For one reason, environmental damage ex­ported is environmental damage that will frequently find its way back home—on imported food, in climate warming, and in the worldwide movement of air, water, and wildlife. As well, extinct species are lost not just for all time, but to all humanity and all nature. People under­stand this increasingly. There is also a trade-off for the rich were they (we) to accept steady or even a modest decline in consumption over tim

e. The trade-off commodity is time—shorter work weeks, earlier re­tirements, less consumption dominated, more leisure oriented lives. The environmental movement must come to be as global as the most global of corporations—to convey the price we all pay for ecological damage in distant locations—and it must come to advocate more explicitly a modest time for money trade-off as, simply, a better way to live.[p. 97]